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Abstract: This paper uses the critical junctures framework developed by Hogan and Doyle 
(2007) to determine if there were critical junctures in privatization policy in Brazil and 
Argentina at the start of the 21st century.  The framework constitutes a rigorous approach to the 
identification of crisis, ideational change, and policy change.  It is used to examine the 
economic disasters in Brazil in 1999 and Argentina in 2001.  Previously, we would have had to 
wait decades before making such an assessment, as there were few tools with which to identify 
critical junctures, and these were usually only effective long after the event. 
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INTRODUCTION   
For institutionalists (Gorges 2001; Mahoney 2000; 
Pierson 2000) periods of abrupt change are generally 
regarded as initiated by crises.  This has resulted in 
scholars differentiating the past into periods of 
normalcy, and critical junctures.  Despite critical 
junctures importance to the analysis of temporal 
processes, the concept has received limited attention 
(Pierson, 2004).  To address this weakness the paper 
modifies, and improves upon, Hogan and Doyle’s 
(2007) critical juncture framework. 
This framework is built upon the hypothesis 
that a crisis induced consolidation of a new idea – 
replacing an extant paradigm – leads to significant 
policy change.  If this is the case, such a framework 
would be capable of explaining why certain crises 
lead to critical junctures in policies, whereas others 
do not.  The differentiating factor would be ideational 
change, which would make identifying ideational 
change a predictor of policy change. 
Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) framework is 
employed in examining the economic problems in 
Brazil in 1999, and in Argentina in 2001, to test for 
critical junctures in privatization policy.  If crisis and 
ideational change are identified, along with third 
order policy change in privatization policy, the 
framework would lead us to conclude there was a 
critical junctures in privatization policy.  Prior to this 
framework being developed we would have had to 
wait decades before making such a pronouncement. 
 
SECTION 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
CRITICAL JUNCTURES CONCEPT 
Development paths funnel units in particular 
directions, with the consequence of increasing 
returns, and resultant irreversibilities (Mahoney, 
2003: 53; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 9).  Critical 
junctures constitute branching points that set 
processes of change in motion, resulting in the 
adoption of an institutional arrangement from among 
alternatives (Mahoney, 2000: 512).  Views vary as to 
the duration of a critical juncture.  For some it 
constitutes a brief period in which one direction or 
another is taken, while for others, it is an extended 
period (Mahoney 2001).  The concept has been 
employed in comparative politics.  Both Collier and 
Collier (1991) and Mahoney (2001) used similar 
frameworks in their analyses of developments in 
Latin and Central America.  For them, critical 
junctures took decades to come about, while their 
after effects were of shorter duration.  Hogan (2005; 
2006) questioned whether these periods of change 
were in fact incremental, and should be considered 
examples of conversion as developed by Streeck and 
Thelen (2005).   
In relation to short term change, Haggard 
(1988: 91) argued that economic depression brought 
into question existing institutions, and resulted in 
dramatic change.  Garrett and Lange (1995: 628) 
showed that electoral landslides created critical 
junctures by producing mandates for policy change.  
Casper and Taylor (1996) employed the concept in 
analyzing liberalization of authoritarian regimes, while 
Hogan’s (2005; 2006) remoulded framework was used 
to examine change in trade union influence over public 
policy 
Critical junctures are regarded as highlighting 
the importance of the past in explaining the present.  
They ‘suggest the importance of focusing on the 
formative moments for institutions’ (Pierson, 1993: 
602).  But, these studies are all postdictive, 
concentrating on history.  If focusing on the formative 
moments of institutions and policies is critical, only 
doing so long afterwards is a significant weakness for 
the concept.  These limitations have led to the 
development of the framework tested here. 
 
SECTION 2: CRITICAL JUNCTURE 
FRAMEWORK  
The framework developed by Hogan and Doyle (2007) 
consists of three sections.  The first section is devoted 
to examining macroeconomic conditions to determine if 
there was a crisis.  In this case we employ double (20) 
the number of observables implications set out in the 
original framework.  This is to add veracity to the 
nature of our findings.  The second section of the 
framework is designed to identify ideational change.  It 
is made up of two subsections, to identify extant 
ideational collapsed and to identify new ideational 
consolidation.  Here there are eight observable 
implications.  The third, and final, section of the 
framework is structured to identify the nature of policy 
change.  This is made up of three observables, all of 
which are derived from Hall’s (1993) three orders of 
policy change.  If a case study satisfies the observables 
in all three sections of the framework then there is a 
critical juncture.   
 Ideational change is the link between crisis 
and policy change.  The nature of the ideational change, 
in the wake of a crisis, will determine the type of policy 
change that occurs.  Thus, through understanding 
ideational change, the framework aims to explain why 
only some crises are followed by radical changes in 
policies.   
 Hogan and Doyle (2007) argue that in the 
absence of ideational change the level of policy change, 
in response to crisis will be of the first or second order, 
but not the third.1  Policy instrument settings, and the 
instruments themselves may change, but without 
ideational change the hierarchy of goals underpinning 
policy will remain unaltered.  In this manner, a crisis 
can be examined to see if it has led to change in the 
ideas underpinning policy.  If ideational change is 
discovered then radical policy change can be predicted, 
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if ideational is not discovered, then something less 
than radical policy change is likely.  Therefore, 
Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) framework contains 
within it a predictive element.     
 Previously, we would have had to wait 
decades after a crisis before declaring if a critical 
juncture in policy had occurred.  With the framework 
utilised here that waiting time is eliminated. 
 
SECTION 3: RESEARCH QUESTION AND 
METHODOLOGY  
 
Research Question 
The research objective is to determine if there were 
critical junctures in the privatization policy of Brazil 
and Argentina at the start of the 21st century.  This 
will be determined using Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) 
critical junctures framework.  The central hypothesis 
is ideational change, in the wake of a crisis, leads to 
radical policy change.  We must ascertain whether 
the difficulties in those economies were crises, if 
crises are confirmed did they led to ideational change 
with regard to privatization, and, if ideational change 
is confirmed, did this led to a radical change in 
privatization policy.   
 
Case Selection, Time Frame, Privatization Policy  
Latin America is turning left (Castañeda, 2006).  
‘Political parties, which can broadly be characterised 
as being from the left and the centre left are in power, 
have been in power or have good chances of gaining 
power’ (Panizza, 2005: 716-717), at national, state 
and municipal levels.  The reasons for this are not 
particularly complex, given the region’s unparalleled 
socio-economic inequalities, and persistent levels of 
indigence, that have become increasingly associated 
with the last quarter century of neoliberal 
restructuring and democratic reform (ECLAC, 2005).  
However, this political development has also seen the 
emergence of politicians and political movements 
exhibiting many characteristics of ‘classical’ era 
populism – advocacy of economic nationalism, 
redistributive social policies, and increased state-
intervention in the economy.2 
What merits attention is that the apparent 
resurgence of the left in the region has occurred along 
to two lines – the radical populist left and the 
reformist left (Castañeda 2006; Panizza 2005).  The 
latter was the radical orthodox left that successfully 
reconstructed in accordance with the new political 
realities of neoliberal globalisation.  Responding to 
popular demands, it seeks to mitigate the negative 
excesses of the neoliberal model through gradual 
reform and regulation.  This raises questions as to 
why in some cases the region witnessed the 
emergence of reformist left-of-centre forces, while in 
others it saw an apparent return to the populist policies 
of the past. 
Economic crisis is a proxy for “generative 
cleavages” as it render politics highly fluid (Garrett, 
1993: 522), generating debates concerning economic 
models, which can lead to radical ideas to replace 
existing paradigms.  As such, economic crises may be a 
crucial independent variable explaining the re-
emergence of populism in the region.  Thus, the 
economic situations in Brazil (1999), and Argentina 
(2001), are examined.  In Brazil, President Luiz Inácio 
Lula de Silva of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT – 
Workers Party), has been characterised as belonging to 
the more moderate reformist left, while his counterpart 
in Argentina, Nestor Kirchner, is frequently accused of 
old style populism (Castañeda, 2006; Panizza, 2005).  
Change in privatization policy is focused upon as it is a 
core tenet of conservative economic restructuring.  
Change in such a policy may indicate wider changes in 
macroeconomic policy. 
 
SECTION 4.1: IDENTIFICATION OF 
MACROECONOMIC CRISIS  
The critical junctures literature is invested with the 
concept of crisis.  This places ‘particular emphasis on 
the tensions leading up to a critical juncture’ (Collier 
and Collier, 1991: 32).  Any of a range of external 
shocks are cited as explanations for policy change 
(Greener, 2001; Golob, 2003: 373).  
Crises tend to be rare events rendering 
definition and identification difficult (Yu et al., 2006: 
439).  Consequently, how do we identify a crisis?  
Stone (1989: 299) argues that a situation does not 
become a problem until it is regarded as controllable.  
But, if something is controllable it must be measurable, 
otherwise how would we know if we are controlling it?  
Thus, a crisis must be quantifiable.  Kaminsky et al., 
(1998) and Berg and Pattillo (1999) advocated 
individual variables when quantifying currency crises.  
Pei and Adesnik (2000: 138-139) developed a broader 
range of criteria for identifying macro-economic crises: 
annual inflation rate greater than 15 per cent, stagnant 
or negative annual gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth, and historians and other analysts’ descriptions 
of significant deterioration in economic and financial 
circumstances.  For Garuba (2006: 21), Kwon (2001: 
105), and Solimano (2005: 76) a macro-economic crisis 
can be identified through the general indicators and 
perceptions of growth, inflation, employment creation, 
poverty reduction, and their combined socio-
psychological burden on society.  Here we seek to 
identify macroeconomic crises with greater certainty, 
through the use of quantitative and qualitative 
measures. 
Defining anything as a crisis, including a 
macro-economic downturn, requires subjective and 
objective deliberations (Pei and Adesnik, 2000: 139).  
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Consequently, González (2005: 93) suggests the 
adoption of a multifaceted approach.  Agents must 
diagnose, and impose on others, their notion of a 
crisis before action to resolve uncertainty can take 
meaningful form (Blyth 2002: 9).  This fits with 
Hay’s (1999: 321) perception of a crisis as the 
triumph of a simplifying ideology.  Consequently, we 
develop a broad range of observable implications, 
which include, and build upon, the objective and 
subjective criteria of previous studies.  These twenty 
observable implications accept that a macro-
economic crisis constitutes a severe economic low 
point (See Appendix A for observables).  We argue 
that at least 50 per cent of all observable 
implications, for which there are findings, should 
point to economic crisis. 
 
Brazil - Crisis: 1998-2000 
Brazil undertook an inflation stabilization programme 
in 1994, the Plano Real (Netto, 1999), pegging the 
real to the dollar.  This reduced inflation from 50 per 
cent per month to 3.2 per cent annually by 1998 
(Figure 1).  However, there was substantial exchange 
rate appreciation during this period, making Brazilian 
goods relatively more expensive, contributing to an 
alarming current account deficit by 1997 (Bulmer-
Thomas, 1999: 730).   
 
Figure 1: Inflation; Unemployment; Trade 
Openness; Imports  
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Source: Data Gob, Government Indicators Database; 
Instituto Brasileiro do Geografia y Estadistica 
 
Interest rates doubled as the repercussions of the 
Asian crisis reached Brazil (Figure 2), indicating the 
fragility of its financial situation (Heymann, 2001: 
16).  At the same time, inflation began rising again, 
reaching almost 5 per cent by 1999.  Nevertheless, 
the authorities promised a new assault on fiscal 
problems, now aggravated by higher interest 
payments on government debt. 
 
Figure 2: Brazilian Interest Rates 1995-2006 
 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil 
 
However, the government, with an eye to the 1998 
elections, failed to make good on its commitments, and 
the budget deficit grew to 8.4 per cent of GDP.  As a 
result debt/GNI increased to almost 32 per cent by the 
end of 1999 (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Debt Services (% of exports of goods and 
services; Total Debt (% of GNI) 
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Source: Data Gob, Government Indicators Database 
 
But, following the Asian crisis, and Russian bond 
default, investors became risk averse (Kaminsky et al., 
2003: 51), this evidenced by Standard and Poor’s, 
Moody’s and Fitch’s downgrading of Brazil’s credit 
rating (Table1).  By 1999 Brazil was not considered a 
safe bet in terms of investment, although it improved 
somewhat subsequently. 
As $30 billion fled the country in September, 
the central bank raised interest rates to 43 per cent.  
Unemployment reached 9 per cent by the end of 1998, 
while imports, and trade openness declined.  President 
Fernando Cardoso, safely re-elected, announced 
measures to slash the deficit, restore confidence, and 
right the economy.3   
However, the real came under attack in 
October 1998.  A $41 billion IMF-led rescue package 
was arranged in November.4  But, President Cardoso 
was unable to get an IMF supported budget (tax 
increases/spending cuts) through the legislature.5  The 
possibility of debt default arose.  As much of the 
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country’s foreign debt was short term this was a 
daunting burden.6  The upper classes, convinced 
devaluation of the real was inevitable, began 
withdrawing investment from Brazil.  The fall in 
gross capital formation for 1998 reflected this (Figure 
4).   
 
Table 1: Credit Ratings  
Source: Moody's Investor's Service; Standard & 
Poor's; Fitch IBCA; at http://www.latin-
focus.com/latinfocus/countries/brazil 
 
As dollars fled the country, and FDI went elsewhere, 
the prospects for the economy, and the value of the 
real, grew bleak.   
To defend the currency, the central bank 
pushed to 50 per cent,7 increasing the cost of 
servicing public and private debt, to the extent 
investors became convinced a default was coming, to 
be followed by a currency collapse.  Consequently, 
high interest rates, instead of slowing the tide of 
dollars leaving Brazil, accelerated the process.  When 
the governor of Minas Gerais announced a 90 day 
moratorium on repayments to the federal government 
the game was up.8  This announcement, and fear that 
the governors of Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do 
Sul could do likewise, threatened the country’s fiscal 
integrity (Rothkopf, 1999: 91).  Foreign investors 
fled Brazilian capital markets (Cattaneo, 2001: 228).  
With the central bank losing $2 billion a day,9 the 
World Bank initiated crisis talks.10 
 
Figure 4: Gross Capital Formation; FDI inward 
stock; FDI Inflows; Current Account Balance 
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Source: Data Gob, Government Indicators Database 
 
 Despite pledges not to,11 the exchange rate 
band was widened to accommodate a modest 
devaluation in January 1999 (Roett and Crandall, 
1999: 279).  While the real/dollar exchange rate had 
been close to parity prior to devaluation, it plummeted 
to two for one by February.  Debt services as a 
percentage of exports almost doubled, rising to 120 per 
cent by 1999 (Figure 3).  The decision to devalue 
damaged the government’s credibility, putting severe 
pressure on the central bank, whose diminished foreign 
currency reserves were preventing another 
devaluation.12  However, devaluation did not stop the 
hemorrhage of dollars.  The inflow of FDI, and FDI 
inward stock, both declined in 1999, relative to 
previous years, reflecting a loss in investment (Figure 
4).  Paul Krugman warned that Brazil was at risk from 
anyone who could take money out of the country.13 
 The Sao Paulo stock exchange plunged 10 per 
cent on the day of devaluation.  However, within a few 
weeks this policy collapsed, forcing the resignation of a 
second central bank governor.  Arminio Fraga, the new 
governor, floated the currency.14  There was widespread 
fear of a return to the high inflation of the 1980s, and a 
default on public debts (Bulmer-Thomas, 1999: 729).  
The country experienced significant declines in 
industrial output and GNP.15  The percentage of the 
population below the poverty line surpassed 25 per 
cent.16  The New York Times – observing that Brazil 
was in crisis, with capital fleeing, and state 
governments defying the central authority17 – predicted 
a debt default.18  Yet, most indicators of economic 
performance did not reach decade long lows (Figure 5).  
In fact, real GDP grew in 1998, albeit by only 0.1 per 
cent, and grew by 0.8 per cent the following year.  
However, GDP was to rise by 4.5 per cent in 2000, 
while the highest inflation rate in 2000 was 7 per cent.19  
GNI per capita growth stagnated between 1998 and 
1999, before gradually recovering.20 
 
Figure 5: GDP Growth(%); GDP per capita 
growth(%); GDP growth(5 yr. av); GNI per capita 
growth (%) 
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Source: Data Gob, Government Indicators Database 
 
‘Many commentators in the first half of 1999 assumed 
that Brazil would have to restructure its debt (a 
euphemism for default)’ (Bulmer-Thomas, 1999: 736).    
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Moody's B2 B1 B1 B1 B2 B1 
S & P B+ B+ BB- B+ B+ BB- 
Fitch BB- BB- BB- B B+ BB- 
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Summers (2000: 5) rated the situation as a major 
financial crisis.  By early March the Brazilian central 
bank was still struggling to prop up the real.21  
However, the bank’s framework for targeting 
inflation made progress, and it regained credibility.  
Economist Henry Kaufman argued that Brazil's 
problems were a reflection of slowing international 
economic activity.22  For investment strategist Barton 
Briggs the devaluation was part of a creeping 
deflation.23 
Yet, by the middle of the year the real had 
recovered.  Inflation did not rise, nor output fall, by 
as much as expected, while interest rates gradually 
declined (Heymann, 2001: 16).  By August financial 
analysts were predicting the economy would contract 
by 1 per cent, compared with earlier estimates of 5 
per cent.24  Hakim (2000: 110) argues that the 
country succeeded far beyond anyone’s expectations 
in recuperating from the crisis.  This success was 
reflected in the citizens’ opinions of their 
government’s performance and its level of 
corruption, with them rating its effectiveness as -
0.1825, only slightly below the world average of 0, 
and its corruption at 0.0426, slightly above the world 
average of 0 (Figure 6).   
 
Figure 6: Governmental Effectiveness and 
Corruption Measures 
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Source: Data Gob, Government Indicators Database 
 
Summers and Williamson (2001: 56) argued the 
central problem for Brazil was a pegged exchange 
rate that lacked the measures necessary to make the 
peg stick.  Although Brazil avoided economic 
prostration, as it is Argentina’s main trading partner 
meant the depreciation of the real left the peso, also 
pegged to the dollar, overvalued.  This was to have 
devastating consequences for Argentina (Kamensky 
et al., 2002: 52). 
 
Argentina - Crisis: 1999-2002 
For most the 1990s the Argentine peso was pegged to 
the dollar.  During these years the dollar appreciated 
in against other currencies, and so did the peso.  This 
resulted in the overvaluation of the peso, especially in 
relation to the Brazilian real.  While Argentine exports 
declined, imports increased, and the national debt, 
denominated in dollars, grew rapidly. 
After recovering from a short recession 
following the 1995 Mexican crisis, Argentina’s 
economy was hit again in 1998.  International financial 
turmoil in the wake of the Asian crisis, and anxiety over 
the Brazilian economy, resulted in high interest rates 
(Figure 7), a stock market plunge, and slow growth.27  
According to The Economist the Argentine economy 
shrunk by 3.2 per cent in 1999.28  The national debt, 
denominated in dollars, double between 1993 and 2001 
(Mulraine, 2005: 7).  But, hailed as an example of free 
market reforms, Argentina was permitted to further 
indebt itself.  By the late 1990s Argentina was facing a 
dilemma.  To break the link with the dollar and permit 
the peso depreciate would improve the country’s export 
situation, but would drive the national debt higher.   
 
Figure 7: Argentine interest rates 1995-2006 
 
Source: Banco Central de la República Argentina. 
 
In early 2000 the government began cutting spending 
and increasing taxes, to close the budget gap (Saxton, 
2003: 10) which had reached 3.8 per cent (Desai, 2003: 
177).  The government bet the contradictory effects of 
its decision would be offset by the boost to confidence 
from putting the public finances in order – allowing 
interest rates to fall.  However, this ignored the fact that 
the economy was shrinking, and would result in further 
reducing the already diminishing tax base.  As it was 
deficit spending that “got Argentina into its mess,” in 
the first place,29 the tax increases, instead of reviving 
the economy, drove it into stagnation.30  There was, 
according to Fronti et al., (2002: 12), a genuine crisis of 
economic fundamentals.  In November 2000, Standard 
& Poor’s downgraded Argentina’s credit rating to BB-, 
suggesting it faced major uncertainties regarding its 
capacity to meet its financial commitments.  Moody 
and Fitch soon did likewise (Table 2).  By late 2000 the 
country was experiencing economic stagnation and 
political confusion.31 
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Table 2: Credit Ratings 
Source: Moody's Investor's Service; Standard & 
Poor's; Fitch IBCA; at http://www.latin-
focus.com/latinfocus/countries/argentina/argeiratings.
htm 
 
Surveys discovered pessimism about the economy, 
with 32 per cent of people believing they would be 
worse off in 12 months.32  This mood darkened as 
tension increased between Argentina and the IMF 
(Eichengreen, 2003: 75).  Financial analyst Mailson 
da Nobrega argued that “the crisis in Argentina has 
become permanent.”33  If the peso was kept pegged to 
the dollar exports would continue to fall, and the 
national debt continue to grow.  If the peso was 
unpegged from the dollar its value might collapse, 
and although exports would grow, the national debt 
would explode.  In late 2001 capital flight reached 6 
per cent of GDP, and the government found itself 
increasingly unable to meet debt repayments 
(Kaminsky et al., 2003: 63).  On 30 November $1.3 
billion fled the banks, and the central bank’s net 
reserves slumped by $1.7 billion.34  The slump in 
gross capital formation, and the reversal of FDI 
inflows (Figure 8) bears witness to the declining 
attractiveness of Argentina as an investment option.  
With the effective freezing of bank accounts on 1 
December, to stop the run on the banks, the crisis 
exploded onto the streets.  Bonelli (2004: 216) points 
out that billions of dollars of investment had left the 
country.   
 
Figure 8: Gross Capital Formation; FDI inward 
stock; FDI Inflows; Current Account Balance 
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Source: Data Gob, Government Indicators Database 
 
The Wall Street Journal described the situation in 
Argentina as chaos.35  The Independent declared 
Argentina to be in political and economic 
meltdown.36  When Argentine daily Pagina/12 declared 
the country to be locked in crisis, it began receiving 
calls from politicians to reign in its headlines.37  By this 
stage economics and finance ministers began 
resigning.38  Following violent protests, in which many 
were injured and killed, the government collapsed in 
late December.  Now, recession, crushing debt, and 
political paralysis, assumed epic proportions.39  Citizens 
declining confidence in their government was reflected 
in the effectiveness index falling from 0.28 in 2000, 
well above the world average of 0, to -0.47 in 2002 
(Figure 9).  While Argentines regarded their 
government as somewhat corrupt in 2000, with a score 
of -0.34, this had fallen to -0.78 by 2002.  Starr 
described the Argentine economy as being driven into 
the ground,40 while De Rosa pointed out that the reason 
for the crisis was government spending, which outpaced 
revenue collection,41 partly due to enormous 
corruption.42 
 
Figure 9: Governmental Effectiveness and Corruption 
Measures  
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Source: Data Gob, Government Indicators Database 
 
President de la Rua’s successor Ramón Puerta was in 
office two days when succeeded by Adolfo Saa.  Saa 
declared a debt moratorium, but a few days later 
Argentina announced the biggest default in history - 
$132 billion.43  By this time unemployment had 
surpassed 18 per cent.44  Saa then announced the 
creation of a new currency, the Argentino, a solution to 
the shortage of cash.  However, this currency never 
came into being.  Saa was in office two days when 
replaced by Eduardo Camaño, who lasted just three.  In 
January 2002 new President Duhalde unpegged the 
peso from the dollar, and it promptly lost 75 per cent of 
its value, triggering rapid inflation (Gurter, 2004).  This 
had an immediate impact on the remaining debt, which 
tripled in value.  The jump in inflation between 2001 
and 2002 was dramatic, climbing from -0.17 to almost 
26 per cent (Figure 10).  Imports of goods and services 
slumped, reflected in the declining trade openness.   
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Moody's B1 B1 Ca Ca Caa1 Caa1 
S & P BB BB- SD SD SD SD 
Fitchl BB BB DDD DDD DDD DDD 
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Figure 10: Inflation; Unemployment; Trade 
Openness; Imports 
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
Inflation %
Unemployment %
Trade Openess 
Imports of Goods and
Services (% of GDP)
 
Source: Data Gob, Government Indicators Database 
 
All the while the central bank, struggling to stabilize 
the currency’s value,45 spent vast amounts of foreign 
exchange (Desai, 2003: 173).  ‘Because most debt 
instruments in Argentina were denominated in 
dollars, the depreciation of the [peso] made it 
impossible for borrowers to earn sufficient money to 
repay their dollar-denominated loans’ (Cavlo and 
Mishkin, 2003: 101).  The depreciation of the peso 
also diminished gross national income.  Thus, despite 
the debt default, and the fall in debt services as a 
percentage of exports from 70 per cent in 2000 to just 
above 40 per cent in 2001, the remaining debt as a 
percentage of GNI increased dramatically, reaching 
160 per cent.  That both indicators in Figure 11 
simultaneously veered dramatically in opposite 
directions is a clear indication of a troubled economy.  
The financial sector had gone into meltdown. 
 
Figure 11: Debt Services (% of exports of goods and 
services; Total Debt (% of GNI) 
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The public was enraged over the economic mess, 
soaring unemployment, and the disappearance of 
their savings.46  An indication of how negatively they 
regarded the economy, and their suspicions of 
political corruption, was the clamour for dollars.47  
Daseking et al., (2004: 1) argued it was one of the worst 
economic crisis in the country’s history, a view echoed 
by many economists (de la Torre et al., 2002; Feldstein 
2002; Mussa 2002). 
 After an initially populist line, President 
Duhalde sought to work towards a solution with the 
IMF.  But, the political response to the crisis, and the 
actions of the five presidents who dealt with it, was 
chaotic.  By early 2002, Argentina was in the midst of a 
depression.48  GDP growth, and GDP per capita growth 
were both down over 10 per cent (Figure 12).  These 
declines were mirrored in the decline of GNI per capita 
growth, and GDP growth averaged over five years.  
Real GDP fell by 28 per cent between 1998 and 2002, 
while real wages declined by 23.7 per cent, inflation 
reached 41 per cent, and unemployment peaked at 23.6 
per cent (Saxton, 2003: 1).   
 
Figure 12: GDP Growth (%); GDP per capita growth 
(%); GDP growth (5 yr. av); GNI per capita growth (%) 
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In 2002 the number of people below the poverty line 
doubled to 60 per cent, while growth contracted by 4.4 
per cent.49  All measures of economic performance had 
sunk beyond decade long lows.  It was a crisis of 
unprecedented financial turmoil, and a shocking drop in 
output (Guidotti, 2006).  For Zanetta (2004: 176) this 
constituted the utter collapse of Argentina’s economy.  
For Miller et al., (2005: 1) a ‘full-blown financial crisis 
where the collapse of the exchange rate and the 
paralysis of the banking system precipitated an 
Argentine Great Depression.’       
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Table 3 – The Identification of Macroeconomic 
Crisis 
 
From Table 3 it is clear that Argentina (1999-2002), 
satisfied nearly all above observable implications (95 
per cent) for macroeconomic crisis.  Brazil (1998-
2000) satisfied half of the twenty observable 
implications, and therefore also constituted an 
economic crisis.  The next section examines both 
periods of economic difficulty for changes in the 
ideas underlying privatization policy. 
 
 
4.2 IDENTIFICATION OF IDEATIONAL 
CHANGE 
Previous policies are discredited due to their 
implication in a crisis (Levy, 1994).  Although 
economic crises can have great impact they will not 
determine policy, whose formulation is ‘centred in 
domestic political and ideational processes’ (Golob, 
2003: 375).  Ideas determine policy choices due to 
uncertainty over the workings of the macro-economy, 
the difficulties of interpreting policy effectiveness, 
and the lack of agreement over what constitutes 
“correct” macro-economic policy (McNamara, 1998: 
57).  When an economic model is in difficulty, 
windows of opportunity (Kingdon, 1995) appear in 
which change agents contest the viability of the 
prevailing paradigm.  They present new ideas to 
replace the ones upon which existing policy is based.  
We contend that significant policy change depends 
on actors reaching consensus upon, and subsequently  
 
 
 
consolidating around, a particular set of new ideas.  
These ideas determine the path of subsequent policy, as 
policy-makers work within a framework of ideas and 
standards that specify not only the goals of policy, but 
the instruments to be used to achieve these goals, and 
the nature of the problems they are addressing (Hall, 
1993: 279).  ‘Ideas facilitate the reduction of…barriers 
by acting as coalition-building resources among agents 
who attempt to resolve the crisis’ (Blyth, 2002: 37).  
They are the casual mechanisms of change in any 
critical juncture (Golob, 2003). 
Once agents coalesce around a set ideas 
purporting to offer a solution to current economic woes, 
and an alternative to the current paradigm, they attempt 
to ‘inject’ these into the policy domain.  We contend 
there are three groupings of change agents.  The most 
important are what Dahl (1961) termed ‘political 
entrepreneurs.’  They are similar to Kingdon’s (1995) 
concept of policy entrepreneurs, which constitute our 
second group of change agents.  Policy entrepreneurs 
encompass civil servants, technocrats, academics, 
economists and interest groups etc., who engage in 
policy innovation, and have access to decision makers.  
Policy entrepreneurs are responsible for producing 
ideas, but the political entrepreneur injects these into 
the policy process.  The final group of change agents 
are outside influences, including the media, and 
international organizations, such as the OECD.  They 
The Observable Implications  Argentina 99-02 Brazil 98-00 
   
O1. Main GDP indicators stagnant/negative? X X 
O2. GNI per capita PPP growth stagnant/negative? X X 
O3. 50% + of population below poverty line? X  
O4. Total debt above 100 of GNI? X  
O5. Debt services exceed 100% of exports?  X 
O6. Importations and trade openness declined?  X X 
O7. FDI inflows, and FDI inward stock decline? X  
O8. Gross capital formation as % of GDP declined? X X 
O9.  Annual inflation greater than 15%? X  
O10.  Annual interest greater than 15%? X X 
O11.  Annual unemployment greater than 15%? X  
O12. Decline in sovereign credit rating? X X 
O13. Corruption and gov. effectiveness problematic? X  
O14. Opinion polls regard the economy in crisis? X X 
O15. Media regard economy in crisis? X X 
O16. Commentators regard economy in crisis? X  
O17. Central bank regard economy in crisis? X  
O18. Domestic/international orgs regard economy in crisis? X X 
O19. Politicians regard economy in crisis? X  
O20. Gov. pronouncements on economy consistent with crisis 
management approach? 
X  
Economic Crisis  YES YES 
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critique an existing economic paradigm, advocating a 
new set of ideas as an alternative.   
Should a broad range of agents agree the 
prevailing paradigm is inadequate, and should be 
replaced, the first stage of Legro’s (2000: 419) model 
of ideational change, collapse, will have occurred.  
Five observable implications seek to identify the 
generation of new economic ideas and extant 
ideational collapse (See Appendix B).  However, 
‘even when ideational collapse occurs, failure to 
reach consensus on a replacement could still produce 
continuity, as society reflexively re-embraces the old 
orthodoxy’ (Legro 2000: 424).  In the wake of 
ideational collapse, the issue is reaching consensus 
on a new set of ideas.  If consensus is achieved it 
constitutes the second stage of Legro’s model – 
consolidation – agents co-ordinating a replacement 
set of ideas to the reigning consensus.  This can be 
seen in political entrepreneurs consolidating their 
innovations’ by combining a mixture of interests to 
produce a winning coalition (Sheingate 2003: 192-
193).  Three observable implications seek to identify 
new ideational consolidation (See Appendix B).   
 
Brazil – The Armouring of a Policy 
Privatization was initially considered in Brazil in 
1979, when the government created the National 
Program for Public Sector Rationalisation.  It was not 
until the implementation of the National Plan for 
Privatization (PND) in 1990 that the process was 
kick-started (Mueller, 2001).  In July 1981, the 
military government attempted to initiate 
privatization, passing legislation for transferring 
public companies to the private sector.  A 
commission was created to oversee this process 
(Werneck, 1991).  However, as foreign investors 
were barred, only 20 state-owned companies were 
privatised.  The World Bank described this effort as a 
‘classical example of failure’ (Treisman, 2003: 100).  
In November 1985, with the creation of the 
Interministerial Privatization Council, the legal 
impediment to foreign investors was removed, and 
the Banco National de Desenvolvimento Econômico e 
Social (BNDES) was given a central role in the 
process.  This was crucial, as an economist at the 
bank, Ignácio Rangel proved highly influential in 
disseminating the benefits of privatization to 
powerful interest groups (Werneck, 1991: 62). 
However, the process stalled, and in 1988 it 
appeared this policy would go no further with the 
creation of a new constitution which restricted 
privatization and created state monopolies in 
telecommunications, oil, and gas (Treisman, 2003).  
However, as neoliberal ideas, and policy 
prescriptions, gained salience, President Collor de 
Mello, and his successor Itamar Franco, began 
attacking nationalist economic policies.  Economic 
ideas were used to attack the statist economic paradigm: 
‘We have a government that is too large.’50  Eventually 
Collor de Mello pushed through the PND, and the idea 
of privatization was slowly institutionalised. 
Ironically, it was under President Cardoso, a 
social democrat, that privatization became widely 
accepted.  With the PND now institutionalised, 
privatization was implemented aggressively.  Cardoso, 
desperate to banish hyperinflation, adopted many 
neoliberal policy prescriptions.  Between 1994 and 
1999 the state divested itself of 124 companies.51  By 
1998 ‘the entire telecommunications and railway 
sectors, the largest ports, some of the main highways, 
much of the electricity distribution and generation 
sectors, and some water and sanitation services had 
been transferred to private control’ (Treisman, 2003: 
94).  Mueller (2001) argues that privatization had 
become so embedded due to judicial independence, and 
the autonomy of regulatory bodies, that it would be 
extremely difficult for an administration to reverse 
course.   
 
Brazil – Any Ideas out There? 
Following the devaluation of the real in 1999 and the 
subsequent economic crisis, there was widespread 
disillusionment with the economic model.  Only 25 per 
cent of Brazilians expressed satisfaction with the 
market economy,52 and privatization policy, in 
particular, lost significant support.  Only 26 per cent 
felt satisfied with the level of public services after 
privatization, while support for privatization dropped to 
33 per cent by 2003.53 
The PT, and their Presidential candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula de Silva, began attacking conservative 
economic policies during the 2003 election.  Lula’s 
platform was built upon a promise to tackle the social 
and economic ills generated by this model:  
 
If at one time during the 1990s the current 
model was able to awaken hope of 
economic and social progress, today we are 
left with an enormous feeling of deception.  
Now after eight years of this model, the 
Brazilian people have determined that the 
fundamental promises have not been 
fulfilled and their hopes only frustrated…  
The dominant feeling … is that the actual 
model has exhausted itself [Lula, 2002: 1].54 
 
During the election Lula’s energy advisor, Luiz 
Pinguelli Rosa announced that ‘the period of 
neoliberalism is gone in Brazil.  The privatization phase 
has come to an end.’55  Furthermore, Lula pledged to 
take a tougher regulatory line with privatised 
companies,56 and probe controversial privatizations.57  
Lula, and running mate José Alencar, expressed doubts 
about the extent of privatization conducted in Brazil.58  
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Although dissatisfaction with neoliberalism, 
and privatization, emanated from the PT and Lula, 
there was a lack of public support for this policy.  
Consequently, a mild form of ideational collapse 
occurred.  However, although Lula constituted a 
change agent, he failed to present any alternative 
policy in lieu of state divestiture.  He did not promote 
renationalisation, mainly to calm the markets.  
Instead, Lula called for an end to outright 
privatization (unremarkable, considering there was 
little left to sell), and rather, made commitments to 
increase state involvement in certain sectors.  No 
alternative idea was presented to replace privatization 
as policy.  New ideational consolidation did not 
occur.  
 
Argentina – The Armouring of a Policy 
Argentina is renowned for aggressive privatization.  
After a considerable amount of re-privatization in the 
1970s59 a hiatus was reached.60  It was not until the 
election of Raul Alfonsín that privatization was 
reconsidered (González-Fraga, 1991).  Alfonsín’s 
first attempt at privatization came with the creation of 
Commission 414, to professionally manage the 
process (González-Fraga, 1991: 78).  Progress was 
slow, leading Alfonsín to launch the Ministry of 
Growth in 1985, claiming privatization was needed 
‘to get maximum work productivity.’61  The Ministry 
was responsible for stimulating private sector growth 
in areas traditionally reserved for the public sector.  
This, combined with the creation of the Directorio de 
Empresas Públicas (DEP), was expected to divest 
Argentine of burdensome companies, enabling debt 
repayments, reducing public sector deficits and 
tightening fiscal policy (González-Fraga, 1991: 78).  
However, only four state-owned enterprises were 
privatised, and the policy was deemed a failure 
(Treisman, 2003). 
Carlos Menem accelerated privatization.  
Menem, like many contemporary regional leaders, 
adopted conservative economic ideas, and translated 
them into policy.  He was determined to reduce the 
role of the state, and ‘privatise everything 
privatisable’ (Treisman, 2003: 96).  With anti-state 
feelings rising following 1989’s hyperinflation, and 
with monetarist-based conservative policies 
presenting an alternative economic paradigm, popular 
approval for privatization soared (Goldstein, 1998).  
For Menem, eager to tighten fiscal policy and reduce 
budget deficits, privatization appeared ideal.  He 
began to institutionalise privatization policy, first 
with the Economic Emergency Law, declaring a state 
of emergency in the public sector, and more 
importantly, the Public Sector Reform Law, which 
specifically allowed for privatization (Goldstein, 
1998).  This law empowered the executive to 
privatise state-owned enterprises without Congress’s 
approval (Treisman, 2003), embedding privatization as 
a legal and acceptable policy. 
Menem began privatizations with the sale of 
telecom company ENTEL in 1990.  However, the 
transaction became mired in allegations of corruption, 
and it was not until appointment of Domingo Cavallo as 
Economy Minister, that privatization, as policy, became 
embedded (Goldstein, 1998).  Cavallo instituted a range 
of liberalising structural reforms as he set out to ‘shock 
the economy.’  He made the dollar legal tender, pushed 
for greater efficiency in tax collection, removed trade 
barriers by joining the Mercosur, and promised to sell 
all state-owned enterprises by 1992 (Goldstein, 1998).  
Although the 1992 deadline was missed, between 1991 
and 1994, Menem and Cavallo privatised over 90 per 
cent of state enterprises (Treisman, 2003).  Between 
1988 and 2001, Argentina sold 171 state companies.62  
By 2000, privatization had become institutionalised as 
state policy.  
 
Argentina – Ideas to Pierce the Armour 
Following the economic crisis, and subsequent political 
and social turmoil, there was widespread criticism of 
the economic model, which was perceived to be at the 
heart of the crisis.  Privatization, a tenet of conservative 
economic restructuring, received particular attention as 
a major force behind Argentina’s woes.  Consequently, 
critiques of government policy became widespread, and 
opinion turned against privatization. 
Both trade unions and civil society groups 
organised demonstrations against increases in public 
utility tariffs, and planned privatizations of national 
banks.63  Public opinion turned against the free-market 
economic paradigm, with 51 per cent of Argentines 
feeling the country was going in the wrong direction, 
while only 15 per cent were satisfied with the market 
economy.64  Public opinion, associating privatization 
with this model, displayed remarkable dissatisfaction.  
When asked if privatization had been beneficial, only 
12 per cent of Argentines agreed.65 
 Even conservative newspapers such as El Páis, 
began criticising privatization as viable policy,66 while 
former Brazilian President Cardoso, who oversaw the 
privatization of many Brazilian state enterprises, 
claimed the economic crisis in Argentina was due to 
excessive liberalisation, including excessive 
privatizations.67  With agents agreed on the inadequacy 
of the current policy, ideational collapse had occurred. 
 Nestor Kirchner, although a member of the 
ruling Partido Justicialista (PJ), ran in the 2003 
election on a platform attacking neoliberalism, and the 
policy of privatization that had characterised Argentina 
under Menem.  Three of the four presidential 
candidates argued for greater state regulation.68  During 
the campaign Kirchner criticized previous 
privatizations, arguing that ‘it’s necessary to recover the 
railways, and analyze the [privatization] contracts.’69  
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Kirchner’s calls for renationalisation created jitters 
on capital markets.  Share prices fell 8.6 per cent on 
the Argentine exchange when it became evident that 
Kirchner would win the May run-offs.70  Kirchner 
argued for revision of all privatization contracts.71  
Kirchenr openly attacked Menem’s privatization of 
state oil company YPF.72  The electorate echoed 
these sentiments, with over half supporting the re-
nationalisation of privatised firms.73 
 There was a clear alternative to 
privatization.  When the economy collapsed in 2001, 
agents began criticising the conservative free-market 
economic model and privatization.  Public opinion 
swung against privatization and this, along with 
media and commentators’ criticisms, ensured 
ideational collapse.  Kirchner presented himself as a 
change agent who could inject new ideas into the 
policy domain.  During the election an alternative to 
privatization was presented, around which agents 
coalesced.  This involved the halting of 
privatizations, the re-nationalisation of companies 
considered essential for the public good, and, where 
necessary, public-private partnerships rather than 
wholesale privatizations.  Kirchner, once these 
alternatives had been consolidated, was, with election 
victory in 2003, charged with the task of attempting 
to pierce the armoured policy of privatization.  
 
Table 4 – The Identification of Ideational Change  
 
Of the case studies, only Argentina constituted an 
economic crisis.  Following this crisis, there was 
widespread criticism of privatization policy.  As 
Table 4 shows, all observable implications were 
satisfied, confirming extant ideational collapse, and 
new ideational consolidation.  Kirchner, as political  
entrepreneur, proposed an alternative idea to 
privatization, namely re-nationalisation, leading to 
ideational change.  However, as events in Brazil did not 
constitute an economic crisis, the framework did not 
lead us to anticipate finding ideational change.  
Although privatization policy was challenged there, no 
alternative was consolidated, and consequently, 
ideational change did not occur. 
The next section tests for radical changes in 
privatization policy.  Based upon the results so far, the 
framework leads us to anticipate finding radical policy 
change in Argentina, but not Brazil.  This prediction is 
based upon Argentina experiencing economic crisis, 
and ideational change, while Brazil did not.     
 
4.3 IDENTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN 
GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICY  
The final issue is discovering if there were radical 
changes in privatization policy.  The observables here, 
as developed by Hogan and Doyle (2007), are based 
upon Hall’s concept of first, second and third order 
change (1993).  Hall (1993: 291) argued that policy 
failures, and exogenous shocks, can set off processes 
that lead to great ideational change, resulting in a re-
examination of the belief systems through which policy 
has been generated – a paradigmatic (third order) 
change.  These observables incorporate the notion of 
swift change developed by Hogan (2005), and enable us 
differentiate both normal and fundamental shifts in a 
country’s policies.  As we are dealing with the concept 
of a critical juncture we must assume change is fast.  As 
we are searching for a paradigm shift in policy this 
must encompass the below observables.  
O1. If privatization policy instrument settings changed 
(swiftly) there may have been a radical change in 
government privatization policy.  
The Observable Implications Arg Brazil 
 99-02 98-00 
Ideational Collapse    
O1. Media questioning efficacy of current model and/or specific policy areas. X  
O2. Opposition parties critique current model and propose alternative ideas – at 
elections their platform are built around these alternative ideas. 
X X 
O3. Civil society organisations critique the current model, reflecting Hall’s 
coalition-centred approach.  
X X 
O4. Widespread public dissatisfaction with current paradigm, observable through 
opinion polls, protests etc. 
X X 
O5. External or international organisations critique current model or, actively 
disseminate alternative economic ideas. 
X  
 Y Y 
New Ideational Consolidation   
O6. A clear set of alternative ideas are evident X  
O7. A clear change agent (political entrepreneur) to inject these new ideas into 
policy arena is evident 
X  
O8. Political Entrepreneur combines a mixture of interests to produce consensus 
around a replacement paradigm 
X  
Adoption of New Idea YES NO 
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O2. If the instruments of privatization policy changed 
(swiftly) there may have been a radical change in 
government privatization policy.  
O3. If the hierarchy of goals behind privatization 
policy changed (swiftly) there may have been a 
radical change in government privatization policy.  
 
Brazil 
Once elected, it appeared Lula wanted to disembed 
privatization policy, and translate the economic ideas 
of his campaign into policy.  He announced the 
government wished to renegotiate contracts with 
privatised electricity companies74, and Dilma 
Rousseff, the Mining and Energy Minister, unveiled a 
working group to advise the government on 
regulatory issues relating to privatizations.75  This 
came amidst rumours the government was 
considering re-nationalising Eletropaulo, the 
country’s biggest power distributor.76  José Dirceu, 
PT Chief of Staff, stated that the period of 
privatization was over, although the government 
would not re-nationalise former state-owned 
companies.77 
However, with the PND still in place, and 
under pressure from the IMF on debt repayments, in 
December 2003 Lula announced the privatization of 
Banco de Estado de Maranhao, and three regional 
banks.78  Shortly thereafter, Minister of Transport 
Alfredo Nacimento announced the PT would 
privatise seven motorways.79  Lula came under fire 
from the media, the electorate, and elements of the 
PT for what appeared to be maintenance of 
privatization policy. 
In response to his critics Lula passed decree 
MP 144/03, excluding federal government-owned 
electricity companies from privatization.80  He 
created the Empresa de Pequisa Energetica (EPE),81 
a company responsible for long term energy 
expansion plans, and which reduced the autonomy of 
the regulator.  This marked an increased role for the 
state in the energy sector.  Lula, desperate for 
infrastructural investment, re-iterated that the 
government no longer supported wholesale 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, but favoured 
mixed models,82 with ownership remaining in state 
hands.  This indicates that Lula shifted policy 
somewhat.  In December 2004 he approved the 
Public Private Partnership Bill (PPP), wherein 
wholesale privatization of state-enterprises would 
cease.  Instead, private firms would invest in state-
owned-enterprises, which would remain in state 
hands.  This came on the back of Plano Plurianual, 
an investment strategy requiring 191 billion reais 
(US$65.7 billion) for priority infrastructure.83 
Lula, under IMF pressure, was forced to 
privatise a number of state banks, something he had 
promised not to do.  However, he increased 
government involvement in sectors he considers 
crucial.  Although the PPP bill is, to an extent, a 
product of the old privatization policy, it indicates a 
shift towards capitalisation of state-owned enterprises, 
with the state retaining ownership; and in key sectors 
such as energy, retaining control.  However, outright 
privatizations are still acceptable.  In terms of the 
previous privatization policy under Cardoso, the 
instrument settings have changed, but the instruments 
themselves, and the hierarchy of goals, remain the 
same.  As such, this constitutes a first-order change in 
Brazilian privatization policy.  
 
Argentina 
Once elected, Kirchner began to disembed privatization 
policy, appointing Daniel Azpiauzu, advisor to the 
newly created Ministry of Federal Planning and Public 
Works, to review private utility contracts.  Azpiazu’s 
report critiqued Argentina’s privatization process for 
engendering social inequity.84  Additionally, Kirchner’s 
Economy Minister, Roberto Lavagna, stated that a 
number of state-owned banks, due for sale before the 
election, would not be privatised.85  This, coupled with 
the Financial Restructuring Unit, responsible for 
reforms in the financial and banking systems, signalled 
a shift towards interventionist government policies.86 
Furthermore, Kirchner, under IMF pressure to 
increase utility prices, announced his intention to 
renegotiate public service contracts.  Decree No. 
311/03, created the Public Service Contracts’ Analysis 
and Renegotiation Unit, headed by Roberto Lavagna, 
and Planning Minister Julio de Vido.  This was to 
analyse and renegotiate 61 privatization contracts 
including water services, gas, and electricity.87  The 
magnitude of this policy shift sent capital markets into 
tailspin, forcing Interior Minister, Aníbal Fernández to 
stress that Kirchner was not launching a socialist 
revolution.88  Following reviews by the Public Service 
Contracts’ Analysis and Renegotiation Unit, Kirchner 
fined electricity companies 9 million pesos, for 
‘unjustifiable cuts’ in service.89  In November, 2003, he 
revoked the contract of Grupo Macri, who operated the 
postal service, for failing to repay a debt of 296 million 
pesos to the government.90  The postal service reverted 
to state control, and has remained there. 
In June 2004, Kirchner rescinded the contract 
of rail operator Metropolitano SA91, which held the 
concession on trains in Buenos Aires, arguing the 
company no longer provided reasonable service.  This 
was followed by the creation of a state-owned oil 
company, to increase government involvement in the 
energy sector.92  This came amidst rumours that 
Kirchner planned to renationalise oil firm Repsol-YPF.  
Shortly thereafter, the government rescinded the radio 
frequency concession to Thales SA93 and renationalised 
 
14 
 
Table 5 – The Identification of Change in 
Government Economic Policy 
 
 
the company, after it fell behind on the concession 
fee.  The government also took control of the San 
Martín railway line and Enarsa energy holding.94  
Finally, in August, the government revoked the 
satellite licence of Nahuelsat SA, handing the project 
to a state-run firm.  The Argentine Communications 
Secretariat stated the service was a resource to ‘be 
used in the public interest.’95 
Kirchner’s aggressive anti-privatization 
policies, garnered him increasing support.  Over 78 
per cent of Argentines believed foreign owned 
utilities should be nationalised.96  In 2005, Kirchner 
fined three water and electricity companies for failing 
to provide adequate services.97  In 2006, following 
the decision by shareholders of the Suez group to pull 
out of their water provision contract, due to tariff 
freezes, Kirchner revoked the water-supply contract 
of Aguas de Argentinas, which reverted to state 
control.98 
There has been a reversal of policy in 
Argentina, with the ending of outright privatizations, 
and re-nationalisations, specifically in the provision 
of public goods.  This indicates greater state control 
in the economy, and outright control in areas 
considered essential public services.  The instrument 
settings, the instruments themselves, and the 
hierarchy of goals behind privatization policy, 
embedded in Argentina under Menem, have changed.  
This constitutes a third order change in Argentine 
privatization policy.   
As the situation in Brazil did not constitute 
an economic crisis, the framework did not lead us to 
anticipate finding either ideational change, or 
paradigmatic change in privatization policy there, nor 
did we.  We conclude from our findings that, the 
devaluation of the Real in 1999, and ensuing 
economic difficulties, led to a first-order change in 
privatization policy – no critical juncture. 
We identified economic crisis and ideational 
change in Argentina in 2001.  According to the 
framework ideational change is the differentiating 
factor between crises that lead to paradigmatic policy 
change, and those that do not.  Thus, at the end of the  
 
 
 
 
previous section the framework led us to anticipate 
finding a third order change in Argentine privatization 
policy, which we identified in Table 5.  According to 
the three stage framework, economic crisis, ideational 
change, and radical change in privatization policy 
together constitute a critical juncture in Argentina’s 
privatization policy. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Critical junctures are central to our understanding 
institutional change (Pierson, 2004).  However, until the 
development of Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) framework, 
the concept was postdictive.  In their three stage 
framework, a critical juncture consists of: crisis, 
ideational change, and radical policy change, with 
ideational change the crucial constituent.  The paper 
employed this framework on economic upheavals in 
Brazil (1999) and Argentina (2001) to determine if 
there were critical junctures in privatization policy.  
Privatization policy was concentrated on as it is a 
central tenet of conservative economic restructuring. 
According to the framework, the deterioration 
of the Brazilian economy in 1999 was not an economic 
crisis.  Instead of ideational change, there was minor 
ideational collapse in relation to privatization policy.  
As no alternative ideas were consolidated to replace 
extant policy, the old ideas endured.  In the absence of 
ideational change there was a first order change in 
Brazilian privatization policy.  The 1999 economic 
upheaval in Brazil did not lead to a critical juncture in 
privatization policy.  
The economic malaise in Argentina in 2001 
constituted an economic crisis as defined by the 
framework.  Following this crisis, alternative ideas 
were proposed to replace the existing policy of 
privatization, and a clear change agent (Kirchner) was 
identified.  Ideational collapse, and subsequent 
consolidation of a new idea, was identified by the 
framework.  Finally, a paradigmatic (third order) 
change in privatization policy was uncovered.  The 
2001 crisis in Argentina resulted in ideational change, 
followed by a radical change in privatization policy, 
which, the framework considers a critical juncture.  
The Observable Implications Arg Brazil 
 99-02 98-00 
O1. If privatization policy instrument settings changed there may have been a 
radical change in privatization policy.  
X X 
O2. If the instruments of privatization policy changed there may have been radical 
change in privatization policy.  
X  
O3. If the hierarchy of goals behind privatization policy changed there may have 
been a radical change in privatization policy.  
X  
Radical Change in Privatization Policy  YES NO 
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Previously, researchers would have had to 
wait decades before ascertaining whether economic 
upheavals resulted in critical junctures in a policy 
area.  With this framework, researchers, after 
identifying a crisis, need to discover if the ideas 
underpinning their policy of interest have changed.  If 
there was ideational change they should be able to 
predict a third order change in that policy is coming, 
or, if it has already taken place, that it constitutes a 
critical juncture.  Alternatively, if there was no 
ideational change they should be able to predict that 
existing policy will endure.  The framework, a 
significant advance for political science, reasserts the 
value of the critical junctures concept.  
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Appendix A 
 
Economic Crisis Observable Implications  
 
O1. If annual GDP growth (Pei and Adesnik, 
2000); GDP growth per capita; and GDP growth 
averaged over 5 years were stagnant or negative, 
then the economy may have been in crisis. 
O2.  If GNI per capita ppp growth was stagnant or 
negative, then the economy may have been in 
crisis. 
O3. If more that 50 per cent of the population were 
below the poverty line, hen the economy may have 
been in crisis. 
O4. If total debt as a percentage of GNI was above 
100 per cent, then the economy may have been in 
crisis. 
O5. If debt services exceed 100 per cent of 
exports, then the economy may have been in crisis. 
O6. If the importation of goods and services; and 
the level of trade openness declined, then the 
economy may have been in crisis. 
O7. If FDI inflows, and FDI inward stock 
declined, then the economy may have been in 
crisis. 
O8. If gross capital formation as a percentage of 
GDP declined, then economy may have been in 
crisis. 
O9. If the annual inflation rate was above 15 per 
cent (Pei and Adesnik, 2000), then the economy 
may have been in crisis. 
O10. If the annual interest rate was above 15 per cent, then the economy may
have been in crisis. 
O11. If the annual unemployment rate was above 15 per cent, then the economy 
may have been in crisis. 
O12. If the country’s credit rating, as measured by independent agencies (S&P, 
Moody, Fitch) declined, then the economy may have bee
O13. If corruption and government effectiveness are perceived to be problems, 
then the economy may have been in crisis. 
O14. If opinion polls regarded the economic in crisis, then the economy may have 
been in crisis. 
O15. If the national media regarded the economy in crisis, then the economy may 
have been in crisis. 
O16. If economic and political commentators regarded the economy in crisis, 
then the economy may have been in crisis. 
O17. If the central bank regarded the economy in crisis, the 
been in crisis. 
O18. If both domestic and international organisations (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD)) regarded the economy in crisis, the 
economy may have been in crisis. 
O19. If elected representatives regarded the economy in crisis, the economy may 
have been in crisis. 
O20. If government pronouncements on the economy were consistent with a 
crisis management approach, the economy may have been in crisis.
 
                                                                          
Appendix B 
 
Idea Generation Observable Implications  
Ideational Collapse 
O1. The media questions the efficacy of the 
current model and/or specific policy areas.  
O2. Opposition political parties critique the 
current model and propose alternative ideas – at 
election time their platform will be built around 
these alternatives. 
O3. Civil society organizations, e.g. labour 
unions, employer organizations, consumer groups 
etc. critique the current model, reflecting Hall’s 
(1989: 12) coalition-centred approach. 
O4. Widespread public dissatisfaction with the 
current paradigm, observable through opinion 
polls, protests etc. 
O5. External or international organizations 
critique the current model and/or actively 
disseminate alternative ideas. 
 
New Ideational Consolidation  
O6. A clear set of alternative ideas, developed by 
policy entrepreneurs, are evident. 
O7. A clear change agent (political entrepreneur) 
injecting new ideas into the policy arena is 
evident. 
O8. The Political Entrepreneur combines a 
mixture of interests to produce consensus around a 
replacement paradigm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
